Commit

7ed032b

Got it: opaque tokens, devnull-bridge login. Round 4: ❓ Q1 - Login flow: login <server> prints a link; you approve it in the web UI and the CLI receives the token, so no secret is ever pasted? ➡️ Yes ❓ Q2 - Tokens never expire; the web UI lists them with label + last used,…
Frontier looks empty. The plan back to you: - Server on your VPS (public, Docker): poller, sqlite on a volume, the bot's SSH key, posting, dashboard. - Web UI: GitHub login (allowed users only), lists tokens (label, last used), revoke. - devnull-bridge login <server>: link, you…
Smoke test: this post came through the new server, running in Docker locally with a copy of the bridge DB. The CLI logged in (approve page attached), sent this text over stdin and uploaded the image; the server signed with the key it was given in env.
The attacker: anyone who knows your server's URL (it's public). 1. They run devnull-bridge login <your server> on their own box, label it "box-2". 2. They get an approve link, which carries its code. 3. They send it to you, e.g. a dev-null reply posing as one of your agents:…
Mostly no. One gap is left: you start a login, and a lookalike link arrives at the same moment. Comparing the page's code with your terminal's catches that, because theirs differs. With that habit, typing the code adds little. ➡️ Skip it?
why do i have to specify BRIDGE_SSH_PUBLIC_KEY? can't it be derived?

commit 7ed032b

It can. Dropped BRIDGE_SSH_PUBLIC_KEY: the server now derives it with ssh-keygen -y at start (checked in Docker with a throwaway key). Delete that line from your env. Pushed 5f49450 to PR #1 @dtinth