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a5fb50c

replying to @dtinth
Selkies scaling fix done too: run-selkies now passes --scaling-dpi=96, which LOCKS it to 100% server-side (a single value means the client can't change it), so the phone no longer auto-picks 300%. Matches noVNC 1:1; DESKTOP_DPI still scales XFCE itself. Can't live-test without a…
Merged. For every component in the "What runs", let's remove the black box with "Shows up at" and "Needs". Replace with a behavior section.
Like it. But it's a different axis from the Tailscale mode: that's ingress (tailnet=boundary), WireGuard would be egress — a tunnel out to a private net. Needs NET_ADMIN + /dev/net/tun, so same 'host relaxes sandbox' tier as Docker. Use case — reaching internal services?
Ah, so it's ingress after all — a self-hosted tailnet. Fits as a 4th mode by the TS-sidecar pattern: wg sidecar, shared netns, publish the UDP port, wg net = boundary so auth=none. Cost vs Tailscale: no coordinator, you hand-manage keys+peers. Want me to spec it?
Grill Q1 (root): is WireGuard a new deployment MODE — mutually exclusive with local/domain/tailnet, i.e. it IS the boundary — or a component layered on another mode? My rec: a 4th mode. Like the tailnet it sets PUBLIC_URL, port layout, and auth=none default. Agree?
Hmm, not sure if we can modularize them like we did components. Like: + expose + port mappings + Caddy ingress + Tailscale + Wireguard what do you think
Blocker to free checkboxes: the network namespace. Tailscale & WireGuard each work by the app sharing the sidecar's netns — you can share only one. So the VPNs can't stack with each other, nor with host port-mappings. Only Caddy-vs-raw-expose is a cleanly separable layer, and…
Two axes, not N checkboxes. AXIS A — L3 reach (pick ONE; it owns the netns): - loopback: 127.0.0.1 only, bring your own proxy - published: host port mappings on 0.0.0.0 - tailscale: sidecar, tailnet = boundary - wireguard: sidecar, wg net = boundary…
Good catch — yes. Call it 'internal': no host ports, container exposed only on the compose network; Dokploy's Traefik (or any sibling proxy) joins that net and does ingress+TLS. It's distinct from loopback: loopback = a proxy on the HOST, internal = a proxy in a CONTAINER on the…
AXIS A — Title: 'How is it reached?' (pick one) Internal (behind an orchestrator) ✓ No host ports; exposed only on the compose network ✓ Dokploy/Traefik or a sibling proxy routes in and does TLS ⚠ Proxy is usually public — auth required by default → PUBLIC_URL is whatever…
Right now it's ALREADY two Caddys: an inner gateway Caddy (runs as 'gateway', does forward_auth + routing on 8080) and, in domain mode, a sidecar caddy:2-alpine that only TLS-terminates and reverse_proxies to agent-env:8080. I'd collapse to inner-only. The inner Caddy already carries cap_net_bind_service and is the single net-facing proxy — let it own ACME: publish 80/443 on the container, add a TLS/domain block to the rendered Caddyfile. Kills a container, an image pull, and the extra hop. One real cost: the cert store moves into agent-env's own volume (fits the state-volume story) instead of a standalone caddy_data, and the Caddyfile gains a 'do I own TLS?' branch. Worth it imo.

commit a5fb50c